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A UNIFIED

ABSTRACT: We propose in this paper to use Ludics as a unified
framework for the analysis of dialogue and the reasoning system.
Not only is Ludics a logical theory, but it may also be built by
means of concepts of game theory. We first present the main concepts of Ludics. A design is an abstraction and a generalization of
the concept of proof. Interaction between designs is equivalent
to cut elimination or modus ponens in logical theories. It appears
to be a natural means for representing dialogues and also for reasoning. A design is a set of sequences of alternate actions, similar
to a move in game theory. We apply Ludics to argumentative
dialogues. We discuss how to model the speech acts of argumentative dialogues in terms of dialogue acts. A dialogue act is given
by a Ludics action together with the expression that reveals the
action in a turn of speech. We show also how arguments may
be stored in a commitment state used for reasoning. Finally we
revisit an example of juridical dialogue that has been analyzed by
Prakken in a different framework.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The domain of argumentative dialogues has received particular attention in the last thirty years. Studying them requires incorporating both
a precise linguistic analysis of their structure and tools for reasoning
with arguments and knowledges coming from the different participants
of the dialogues. Game theory and nonmonotonic logics are the two
main formalisms that have been used for this purpose, e.g. Walton
(1985); Mackenzie (1990); Poesio & Mikheev (1998); Loui (1998);
Prakken (2008); Lascarides & Asher (2009). Game theory is a natural
setting for taking into account the alternating structure of a dialogue:
a dialogue is a play and a locutor wins when her last argument cannot
be refuted by her interlocutor. Arguments are moves and each turn of
speech introduces elements for further actions. Furthermore, at each
step, (counter-)arguments, i.e. facts or propositions, uttered by an interlocutor should be logically checked against the locutor’s knowledge,
and locutor’s arguments should be compared and evaluated in order
to be able to choose the best one with respect to a current situation.
In order to achieve this last objective nonmonotonic logics are used.
Nevertheless, it seems that the most important argument in favor of
nonmonotonicity concerns the rational management of propositions:
they may be contradicted or their premises may be fallacious, their
validity may be questioned.
We propose to use Ludics (Girard 2001) as a unified framework for
the analysis of dialogue and the reasoning system. In some sense, our
approach, initiated by Lecomte & Quatrini (2010), falls within game
theory. Not only is Ludics a logical theory, but it may be built by means
of concepts of game theory (Basaldella & Faggian 2009). However,
it is noticeable that Ludics is first a theory of interaction: plays are
not given a priori but are the result of the interaction between two
players. In this paper, we show how a dialogue between two locutors
may be incrementally modeled as an interaction between two designs,
which are the elementary objects in Ludics. Besides designs representing the dialogue itself, each locutor is given a commitment state that
contains the pieces of information or knowledges she is committed to
by her interventions. These pieces of information are also represented
as designs. Thanks to the Ludics framework, it is possible to make
inferences, to draw conclusions from these designs, and in particular
Vol. 8: Games, Game Theory
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to model contradictions that may arise during the dialogue. The full
question of inferring the best argument for subsequent interventions,
given the current situation, is outside the scope of this paper.
In section 2, we present the main concepts of Ludics. A design is
an abstraction and a generalization of the concept of proof. Interaction between designs is equivalent to cut elimination or modus ponens
in logical theories. It appears to be a natural means of representing
dialogues and also for reasoning. A design is a set of sequences of alternating actions, similar to a move in game theory. We apply Ludics to
argumentative dialogues in section 3. We give an interpretation of elementary communicational facts as dialogue acts. A dialogue act is given
by a Ludics action together with the expression that reveals the action
in a turn of speech. We discuss speech acts as they appear in argumentative dialogues in terms of sequences of dialogue acts. A dialogue is
then the interaction between two designs, one for each locutor, consisting of such dialogue acts. Finally, we show how arguments given
in interventions may be used for reasoning. Each locutor is given a
commitment state that is a set of designs. For each locutor, designs in
her commitment state together with her design representing her viewpoint on the dialogue may interact in order to manage the evolution
of her state of commitments. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of a
juridical dialogue. We revisit an example already analyzed in Prakken
(2008) and show in particular that interventions of the judge may be
interpreted in a natural way as forced interventions of one or the other
party.
2. LUDICS: A THEORY OF LOGIC BASED ON INTERACTION

Ludics (Girard 2001) is a logical framework developed by J.-Y. Girard around 2000. The motto underlying Ludics is: interaction is a
central concept in logic. This motto can be seen as expressing the
fruitful connection between logic and computer science, namely the
Curry-Howard isomorphism. Recall that this isomorphism establishes
a perfect correspondence between programs and their execution on
one side, and formal proofs and cut elimination on the other side.
A cut between conclusions of proofs enables an interaction between
these proofs, when one of the formulas is the conclusion of one proof,

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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whereas the other is a hypothesis of the other proof. Called modus ponens, it is the main ingredient of reasoning; one of the main results of
proof theory states that it is always possible to normalize a proof, i.e. to
transform a proof with cuts into an equivalent proof without cuts. The
dynamics of computation may therefore be considered as the heart of
logic.
After decades of work studying the properties of this dynamics and
expanding its scope of relevance, Ludics reverses the priorities of the
concepts involved. Traditionally, formulas and proofs are first set, the
cut being one of the rules used in the definition of what is a correct
proof. The cut elimination procedure completes the picture by adding
a dynamics. Then, progressively, to ensure dynamic properties, formulas and proofs have been refined. Linear Logic (Girard 1987) illustrates these changes: conjunction and disjunction connectives are each
replaced by two versions, additive and multiplicative, and the framework of proofnets gives a geometrical presentation to proofs where the
cut elimination property still appears as a property given a posteriori,
i.e. as a reduction of such graphs. Contrary to this, in Ludics, cut,
i.e. interaction, is a primitive concept. Neither formulas nor proofs are
considered primitive but are rather designs, whose sole purpose is that
they carry on the interaction. In fact, interaction takes place between
two designs as a step-by-step progression through two dual paths, one
path in each design. A design is then nothing else but a set of potential
paths where interaction may take place. Moreover, a design is essentially defined by its counter-designs: those with whom it interacts.
The basic steps of interaction (called actions in Ludics) correspond
to the basic steps of cut elimination. They make possible the exploration of a design in the way that one can explore a formula through
its main connective to its subformulas, and so on. However, a design
abstracts from the notion of formula: a design has only loci, i.e. addresses, through which interaction passes. When a set of designs is
given, the space where interaction with these designs may take place
is also given. This space is defined by all the counter-designs of each
design of this set. This gives an external viewpoint on designs, from
which one may observe regularities. Formulas may then be retrieved
as sets of designs closed relative to these counter-designs. Indeed, exploring a set of designs reduces to exploring each design of this set.
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When it is closed, a set of designs describes all the ways to explore the
object it represents, up to its undecomposable elements. This has to
be related to the concept of a formula, defined inductively by its connectives and the subformulas that compose it including propositional
variables or constants. Moreover, and this is an essential property of
Ludics, some designs associated with a formula may be proofs (of this
formula): those designs that satisfy suitable properties, among which,
precisely, the fact that the exploration can always continue until a suitable term. So, the truth of a formula requires the existence of some
proof belonging to the set of designs and associated with the formula.
The formalization of argumentation in Natural Language that we
propose takes as “primitive” objects of interaction: actions and designs,
taken prior to their logical reconstruction. The fact that interaction is
the fundamental concept of Ludics justifies its relevance to the study of
dialogues, hence also to Natural Language (Lecomte & Quatrini 2011).
Remark that Ludics has also been used in the same spirit for formalizing web processes (Fouqueré 2011).
In the following, we present concepts of Ludics, i.e. mainly actions,
designs and interaction. Anticipating the modeling of argumentation
that will be more formally presented in section 3, we illustrate these
concepts by means of a small dialogue. The reader may find exhaustive
presentations of Ludics in Girard 2001; Curien 2005a,b.
Example 1. The dialogue is between an examiner and Theo. It is part of
a Turing test: the examiner has to understand if Theo is a machine or a
human.

6
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I1
I2
I3
I4
I5
I6
I7
I8
I9
I 10
I 11
I 12
I 13
I 14
2.1.

Examiner
Theo
Examiner
Theo
Examiner
Theo
Examiner
Theo
Examiner
Theo
Examiner
Theo
Examiner
Theo

You want to speak about music or math?
Music.
What kind of music do you play?
I play piano, and I sing also.
Play us a piece of piano.
There is no instrument in this room.
Then sing something.
I prefer to speak of math.
What is 11 and 11 ?
22.
And 512+512?
I’ve never been good at mental arithmetic.
It does not matter. Try.
Around 1000.

Actions, the Justification Relation and Designs

In Ludics, primitive elements of interaction are actions. Actions are
polarized and appear as dual pairs: for each positive action (resp. negative) κ, there exists a dual negative action (resp. positive) κ and
κ = κ. As in game theory, a justification relation between actions is
given. Moreover, actions are organized in alternate sequences called
chronicles in Ludics. These sequences should satisfy the following
conditions: (i) a positive action can be either initial or justified by a
negative action that precedes it in the sequence, (ii) a negative action,
except the first, is justified by the positive action immediately preceding. Following the metaphor of games, these alternate sequences of
actions can be seen as plays that can be grouped to form strategies
called designs in Ludics (Basaldella & Faggian 2009). Thus, designs
are sets of chronicles that may be interwoven to give rise to what transpires during an interaction. Not all sets of chronicles can be designs:
in particular a design should be organized as a forest, with only one
root when the initial action is positive.
Example 2. We consider only the first nine interventions of example 1. As
a rough approximation, each turn of speech is associated with one action:
κ1 , . . . , κ9 .

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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The sequence of actions κ1 , . . . , κ9 is a play in
terms of game semantics. The justification relation between the actions κ1 , . . . , κ9 is given
on the right where an arrow from action κ to
action κ′ denotes that κ is justified by κ′ .
- The first action κ1 is initial: with intervention I 1 , the examiner initiates the dialogue.
- Actions κ2 and κ8 are justified by this first
action κ1 : the dialogue begins about music
(intervention I 2 ) then the discussion turns on
math (intervention I 8 ).
- Intervention I 4 (action κ4 ) also introduces
two elements, piano and song, that are foci of
interventions I 5 and I 7 (resp. actions κ5 and
κ7 ). The other actions are justified by the actions immediately preceding them.

...
κ9

κ7
κ9
κ8
κ7

κ6

κ6

κ8

κ5

κ5

κ7

κ6

κ4

κ5
κ4
κ3
κ2
κ1

κ4

κ3

...
κ9

κ3

κ2

κ8

κ2

κ1

κ1

Examiner’s design

Theo’s design

Two designs

A play with the
justification relation.

The framework of Ludics allows for rebuilding from a play, the
shape of information that has to be minimally present in the two parts,
i.e. the two locutors in the example. The play is the trace of interaction
given by the dialogue. For that purpose, each action κi present in the
play gives rise to two dual actions, one for each reconstructed design:
a positive action noted κi and a negative action still noted κi .
The principle for rebuilding the designs is the following one:
- Let κ be a positive action present in a design, if κ′ is justified by κ
then κ′ appears as a (negative) daughter in the design. This is the case
with κ2 and κ8 with respect to κ1 .
- Let κ be a negative action present in a design, then it has only one
′
(positive) daughter κ in this design, where κ′ follows κ in the play.
Hence, for example, κ3 is the (unique) daughter of κ2 .
The design on the left has two chronicles. The design on the right is
incomplete as one of its chronicles has a negative action as leaf: each
chronicle should end with a positive action. We only give here part of
the dialogue.

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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We rebuilt designs from the result of an interaction. In the next subsection, we define how designs interact when they are given a priori:
the play is then a travel through the two designs.
It is worthwile at this point to provide a few general comments on
the example. First, representing the dialogue as a trace (a sequence of
visited actions) of an interaction between two designs allows for recovering the two points of view in a dialogue, one for each locutor. Each
action as it appears as an intervention in the dialogue is positive for
the locutor and negative for her addressee. More precisely, a positive
action in some locutor’s design corresponds to an active role of this locutor. A negative action in the locutor’s design corresponds to a passive
role, namely the registration of an intervention of the interlocutor. In
the previous figure, the design on the left is the point of view of the
examiner while the design on the right is the point of view of Theo
(with respect to the dialogue). Second, as we shall see more precisely
with the definition of an action in the next subsection, a positive action
gives rise to potential foci of next actions, i.e. next interventions, for
pursuing the dialogue. As such, there may be more loci induced by an
action than what is (minimally) required in the dialogue. For example,
the dialogue between Theo and the examiner may finish before intervention I 8 , hence speaking math (proposed by intervention I 1 ) may
be useless. Third, polarity of actions as stated above has nothing to
Vol. 8: Games, Game Theory
and Game Semantics

κ6

κ6

κ8

κ5

κ5

κ7

†

κ3

κ6

κ6

κ2

κ8

κ2

κ5

κ5

κ1

κ1

κ4

Examiner’s design

Theo’s design

Interaction between two designs

To be complete, designs in Ludics are made of two kinds of actions:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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.

κ4

κ3

...
κ9

.
9



κ3

.

.

κ4

κ2



κ4

Example 3. Let us consider a variant of example 1. The interaction
is modeled in figure at the bottom of the page. The intervention I 7 ′ is
rendered as a daimon as it ends the dialogue.
I1
Examiner You want to speak about music or math?
I2
Theo
Music.
I3
Examiner What kind of music do you play?
I4
Theo
I play piano, and I sing also.
I5
Examiner Play us a piece of piano.
I6
Theo
There is no instrument in this room.
I 7 ′ Examiner Sorry. Bye.
.

- It starts with the object that contains as root a positive action (hence
unique).
- Each time it goes through a positive action κ of one of the two designs, the travel continues in the other design on the negative action κ
that is dual to κ (when the negative action κ exists), then continues
on the only positive action that follows this negative action in the same
design.
This process continues as long as positive actions that are visited have
a corresponding negative action in the other design. If such a negative
action is not found, the process diverges, i.e. fails.
The trace of an interaction is given by the sequence of pairs of dual
actions followed during this interaction.
...
κ7
κ9

.

An interaction occurs between two designs when each of them contains a path corresponding to the other path. It involves travelling
through these two designs as follows:



Interactions: Elementary Facts

8

2.2.

besides proper actions (as the ones used before) that may be positive
or negative, there exists a special (positive) action called the daimon
and noted †. This action may appear several times in a design, but
always as the last action of a chronicle: a daimon is used as the final
element of an interaction, or in more abstract words the final convergence of the interaction. Interaction between designs may now be fully
defined: The travel begins in the design that contains the positive version of two corresponding initial actions. Each time the travel reaches
a positive action κ of one of the two designs, the travel goes to the
negative dual action κ, if it exists, then it continues with the unique
positive action that follows κ in this design until the positive action
that is reached is the daimon. In that case, the interaction is said to
be convergent, otherwise (e.g. the negative dual action does not exist)
it is said to be divergent. In dialogues, a convergent interaction means
a dialogue that went well.

8

do with distinctions such as question/answer or affirmative/negative
utterances: it is only a matter of who speaks.

10
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κ1

κ3
κ2
κ1
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The action can be present in a design if its locus either is initial or is
generated by an ancestor node in the tree. In fact a design is given
with a set of initial loci, its base. The generation of loci is done in
the following way. If the action (ε, L, I ) is present in a chronicle of a
design then actions on descendant nodes may be located on addresses
L.i where i ∈ I : the action opens new loci for continuing the design, i.e.
the dialogue. For example, if we consider intervention I 1 in example
1, still anticipating the next section, we can say that it introduces two
new loci, one for “Music” and one for “Math”. Hence the action κ1
is formally given as (+, L, {1, 2}) (if L is the initial locus): loci L.1 and
L.2 are possible loci of continuations. And negative actions κ2 and κ8
are respectively given as (−, L.1, {0}) and (−, L.2, {0}). In other words,
the ramification of an action contains the various loci for continuing the
dialogues, these loci may or may not be used as foci of ulterior actions
in the design. Presenting addresses as sequences of integers allows for
taking into account the justification relation: locus L.i is justified by
locus L.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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g
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(+,L 2 ,{L 3 })
(−,L 1 ,{L 2 ,L 7 })

8

8

9
L

f

L

,

,

(

.

.
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9

,

L

,

(+,L 1 ,{L 2 ,L 8 })

• I is a ramification, i.e. a finite set of integers.

(−,L 3 ,{L 4 })

9

(

L

.

(+,L 4 ,{L 5 ,L 8 })

8

(−,L 2 ,{L 3 })
(

• L is the address or locus of the action, concretely a sequence of
integers, that locates the action.

(+,L 3 ,{L 4 })

7

(−,L 5 ,{L 6 })

(

(+,L 5 ,{L 6 })
(−,L 4 ,{L 5 ,L 7 })

L

(+,L 6 ,;)

,

(−,L 6 ,;)

,

9

(

(+, †)

,

.

Example 4. The designs given in example 3 are reproduced below on
the left where actions are replaced by their content (circled actions have
a positive polarity, . . . ). It may also be presented in a proof-style manner
(designs on the right).



• ε is the polarity of the action, either positive or negative.

In the following, we make use of names instead of sequences of integers in order to make the examples easier to read. The reader should
note that distinct actions in the same chronicle have distinct foci, hence
names are distinct. Furthermore, we shall present designs in a proofstyle manner. We hope the following translation of our previous example is sufficiently obvious.

,

Note that in example 3, some actions are not present in the designs
while they were present in the interaction presented in example 2: the
negative action κ7 and pairs of actions κ8 and κ9 . Indeed, in this paper,
we model dialogues as they are given, and do not present designs that
may give rise to some dialogue: we model a dialogue in such a way
that actions present in designs are exactly those that are visited during
the interaction.
We must remark that having such minimal designs or designs with
more actions which could be given a priori does not change the way
interaction occurs.
We must also remark that having designs minimal w.r. to the dialogue or not does not change the actions (and their interpretation).
Why? Because an action in Ludics is concretely defined as either the
daimon (+, †) or a triple (ε, L, I ) where:

12
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†
⊢ L7
L6 ⊢ L7
⊢ L5, L7
L4 ⊢
⊢ L3
L2 ⊢
L8 ⊢
⊢ L1

⊢
⊢ L6
L5 ⊢ L7 ⊢
⊢ L4, L8
L3 ⊢ L8
⊢ L2, L8
L1 ⊢

We should remark that, at that level of description of the dialogue
of example 1, the linguistic expression “Music or Math” is rendered as
a set of two values and in fact the two cases are used in the subsequent
dialogue, one at a time. Such a case is said to be multiplicative. If, in
place of intervention I 1 , we have intervention “What do you want to
speak about? Choose one subjet between music or math.”, it should be
noted that one choice excludes the other with respect to some dialogue.
Such a case is said to be additive. Other simple examples of additive
situations are given by Yes/No questions. Thus, example 1 may be
the following of a dialogue with interventions I 0 : “Do you want to
speak?” from the examiner and an answer from Theo “Yes”. Obviously,
there is no possibility of accepting “Yes” and then going back to an
answer “No” in the subsequent dialogue (as in the case with Math and
Music), however there may be distinct dialogues for each answer: the
two situations are additive. Ludics is able to take into account the
distinction between multiplicative and additive situations: if a positive
action (+, L, I ) is travelled during an interaction, then for each i ∈

Vol. 8: Games, Game Theory
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I exactly one of the negative actions of the form (−, L.i, J i ) may be
travelled during this interaction. The fact that each i may be used
corresponds to multiplicativity, the fact that there cannot be more than
one action for each i corresponds to additivity.
Finally, dialogues may behave badly because of misunderstandings,
or irrelevant answers. Ludics allows for taking into account such situations: at each step, interaction may progress if there exists a negative
action corresponding to the positive one that is considered. This would
not be the case with a variant of example 1 if the examiner proposes
something that is not understandable by Theo. In such a situation, the
interaction is divergent.
Example 5. In the following dialogue, the proposition of the examiner
is incomprehensible by Theo (supposing Theo does not understand german), hence the dialogue is divergent: ramifications of the two actions
are different. Obviously such a divergence may occur at any stage of a
dialogue.
I1
Examiner Willst du etwa Mathematik
oder Musik sprechen?
I 2 ′ Theo
???
(+, L 1 , {L ′ 2 , L ′ 8 })
Examiner

?

(−, L 1 , ???)

14
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further, let D be a set of designs (based on the same initial loci and
the same polarity), the orthogonal of D, noted D⊥ , is the set of designs
that are orthogonal to each design of D. As usual with such a definition,
D⊥⊥ is the closure of the set D as D⊥ = D⊥⊥⊥ . Finally, a set of designs D
such that D = D⊥⊥ is called a behaviour. Logics may then be rebuilt:
a formula is denoted as a behaviour, linear connectives are retrieved
by means of adequate operations on designs and on sets of designs,
a proof of a formula is interpreted as a design in the behaviour that,
mainly, has no daimon.
The interaction with a particular design, called the fax and noted
F a x ξ,ξ′ corresponds to a cut between a proof of a sequent ⊢ A and
the axiom A ⊢ A. However what is obtained when doing an interaction
between a design D of base ξ and a fax F a x ξ,ξ′ is a design isomorphic
to D but of base ξ′ : the fax delocalizes the design which it interacts
with. The fax is recursively defined in the following way, where P f (N)
is the set of finite sets of integers:
F ax ξ′ .i,ξ.i
...

ξ′ .i ⊢ ξ.i

...

(+,ξ′ ,I)

⊢ ξ.I,ξ′

...

...

(−,ξ,P f (N))

ξ ⊢ ξ′

The result of the interaction of D with the fax F a x ξ,ξ′ consists in
substituting ξ with ξ′ in D, and that is all !

Theo
F ax ξ′ .i,ξ.i

2.3.

How Logic is retrieved

A thorough presentation of Ludics and the way it allows for having a
model of Linear Logic is outside the scope of this paper. We refer the
reader to Curien 2005a,b. We only mention a few elements that may be
of interest for our purpose, in particular how orthogonality is defined
and what corresponds to the axiom such as A ⊢ A.
The result of the interaction between two designs D and E either
diverges or is still a design. If it exists, it is noted [[D, E]]: roughly
speaking, it contains the actions of D and E except the dual ones. The
fact that [[D, E]] exists and is reduced to a daimon is the key ingredient
in rebuilding logic: D and E are orthogonal, written D ⊥ E if their
interaction converges and the result is reduced to a daimon. To go
www.thebalticyearbook.org

D1
ξ.1 ⊢

...
⊢ ξ

Dn
ξ.n ⊢

ξ′ .i ⊢ ξ.i

...
(+,ξ,I)

...

⊢ ξ.I,ξ′

...

(+,ξ′ ,I)

ξ ⊢ ξ′

...

(−,ξ,P f (N))

After two steps, we get:
[[D1 ,F ax ξ′ 1 ,ξ1 ]]
ξ′ .1 ⊢

[[Dn ,F ax ξ′ n ,ξn ]]
ξ′ .n ⊢

...
⊢ ξ

′

(+,ξ′ ,I)

The process follows in a recursive manner.
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3. MODELING ARGUMENTATION DIALOGUES

Argumentation has been extensively studied with respect to the three
following questions: what kind of argumentative schemas do we find
in argumentative dialogues, how can we reason with arguments and
compute the best strategy, or at least the next best move, for winning
a controversy, how should contradictions that may arise during a dialogue be managed and how can a coherent solution to the debate
be found? This last question is typically one of the judge’s objectives
during a juridical controversy.
With respect to the first question, game theory has been the model
largely used since the 80’s (see Walton (1985) for a survey of this period, Mackenzie (1990); Prakken (2008); Lascarides & Asher (2009);
Prakken (2011); Ranalter (2012) for more recent works). It offers the
means for modeling the various aspects of a confrontation between
two locutors arguing for two opposite points of view. More concretely,
the different methods for arguing and objecting to a proponent’s argument are modeled as blocks of moves: a dialogue is a sequence of such
blocks. Among them, one may sketch the following:1
- questioning the opponent is the easiest way to force her without revealing one’s own arguments.
- arguing against what is said by the opponent is a more complex situation as it introduces new elements into the discussion, and at the same
time the relation between counter-arguments and arguments must be
logically sound.
- making use of presupposition is a way to force the opponent to accept
a thesis without posing explicitly the proposition. We see below that
such a case is easily dealt with in our model.
- making use of prolepsis consists in anticipating remarks or counterarguments that may come from the opponent. Contrary to presuppositions, proleptic propositions are explicit. The opponent has the possibility to refute elements of such an intervention. One may consider the
interventions of a judge in a juridical situation fit this case.
Reasoning and computing the best strategy for winning a controversy is a complex task as it requires being able to anticipate all possible counter-arguments, and finally to compare arguments in order to
choose the more direct one. Concluding a controversy requires the ability to perform logical computation on the basis of the information that
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comes to light during the dialogue. The approach widely taken consists
in using a non-monotonic logics. For example, Prakken (2005) notices
that “since argumentation typically involves defeasible reasoning, we
need a nonmonotonic logic”.
For our purpose, there is no need to consider a nonmonotonic logic.
As a matter of fact, Linear Logic, and consequently Ludics, allows for
erasing and adding elements in a monotonic logical framework. Furthermore, Ludics integrates in a single framework a game theoretical
structure and an inferential system: interaction of designs is a kind
of modus ponens and a travel through arguments. We sketch in this
section how characteristics of argumentative dialogues may be represented in terms of dialogue acts, where a dialogue act is an elementary
move as understood in Ludics. We model also inferences that may be
performed given a player’s commitment state and the current arguments posed in the dialogue. In the next section, we apply this to the
case of a large example of a juridical dialogue.
3.1.

Speech Acts versus Dialogue Acts

As proposed by Searle (1969), a speech act includes an utterance, its
conditions as well as its effects. Furthermore, as mentioned by other
researchers, it is also necessary to take into account extra-linguistic
elements, as is the case in situations where one calls an object to somebody’s attention with a gesture. This is why communicational act, or
dialogue act is substituted for speech act. Landragin (2008) remarks
that this notion of dialogue act is not precisely defined in the literature.
He suggests defining a dialogue act as “the minimal unit of communication in a dialogical context”, and to found the modeling of dialogues
on that notion. This fits our own approach as an intervention is split
up into elementary acts modeled as Ludics actions.
In most recent studies concerning speech acts, we note also that the
principle of interaction is central. For example, it is the core of the approach of Ginzburg et al. (2003). By the way, revisiting the Speech Act
assignment problem, Beyssade & Marandin (2006) remark that speech
acts have to be considered with respect to the locutors’ points of view.
They posit that “illocutionary forces can be analyzed as conversational
moves”. In the same vein, our analysis considers a dialogue as an inVol. 8: Games, Game Theory
and Game Semantics
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teraction with actions as primitive elements.
In our formalization of dialogues in Ludics, an intervention in a
dialogue conveys one or several dialogue acts. A dialogue act is a
communicational fact whose role is to provide the dynamics and determine the shape of the dialogue. It may be explicit or implicit, verbal
or not (e.g. an acknowledgment given as a gesture). It may appear
as one or more propositions, but also as part of a proposition (word,
adverb, . . . ). It expresses an entitlement or a decision of the speaker,
and also its acknowledgment by the addressee. In some sense, it is
quite close to a speech act. However a speech act may correspond to
several dialogue acts as shown in example 7. Dialogue acts are indeed more elementary than speech acts. They can be seen as the basic
blocks from which one builds interpretation of dialogical interventions
or even utterances. Formally, a dialogue act is defined as an action in
Ludics together with the expression that reveals the dialogue act in the
intervention. Such an expression may be a proposition, a word (e.g. a
single adverb, a noun), a prosodic feature, a non verbal sign (a nod, a
shake, a slap, . . . ). In trivial cases, an intervention is a unique dialogue
act. Otherwise a turn of speech has to be decomposed into sequences
of dialogue acts, hence may correspond to a complex design. Note that
the representation of an utterance in terms of dialogue acts is dependent on the context of the dialogue, and in particular on interventions
that have already occurred.
DEFINITION 1 (Dialogue Act). A dialogue act κ is:
• either a proper dialogue act, that is to say a tuple (ε, L, I , e) where
– the finite sequence of integers L is the focus of κ: the location of the act with respect to the dialogical interaction one
considers,
– I is the ramification of κ: the openings created by the dialogue
act on which new dialogue acts may be produced,
– e is the expression of the dialogue act, that is to say the language or communicational fact by means of which the dialogue act manifests itself,
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– the polarity ε of the act may be positive (+) or negative (−).
The act is positive for the locutor that produces it except when
this act is a constraint from its interlocutor (see below presupposition case). These acts have a dual polarity when received
by the interlocutor.
• or a particular positive dialogue act, still called daimon and noted
(†, e), that registers the end of an interaction that went well. In
that case, the expression e of the dialogue act may often be empty.
Example 6. Consider the following variant of the dialogue between an
examiner and Theo
I0
Examiner Do you want to speak?
I 0′
Theo
No.
I 1 ′′ Examiner Ok. Bye.
Each intervention is reduced to a unique dialogue act that we represent in the following way:
• κ0 /κ0 = (+/−, L, {L 0 }, e0 ) where e0 is the proposition “Do you
want to speak?”; L is a location arbitrarily chosen (since this act
initiates the dialogue) in which the act occurs; this act creates
only one continuation, the one on which Theo may anchor his
answer.
• κ0 ′ /κ0 ′ = (+/−, L 0 , ;, e0 ′ ) where e0 ′ is the proposition “No”; L 0
is the location of the act: this act is justified by κ0 ; this act does
not create new openings as it marks that Theo refuses the discussion.
• κ1 ′′ = (†, e1 ′′ ) where e1 ′′ is the expression “Bye”; with this dialogue act, the examiner informs Theo that the dialogue is finished.
The acts κ0 and κ0 ′ are positive from the point of view of the locutors that produce them: the examiner for the first, Theo for the second,
they are negative for the locutors that receive them. The act κ1 ′′ , positive, is produced by the examiner.
The following example is a standard case of dialogue with presupposition. A presupposition is an implicit assertion considered true
Vol. 8: Games, Game Theory
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within the discourse. It is a good example of the significance of decomposing interventions into elementary acts. The intervention of the
locutor is a unique utterance but generates three dialogue acts, one of
them is negative: it corresponds to an (implicit) intervention proposed
to the interlocutor.
Example 7. Let us consider the following well known example due to Aristotle; a judge asks a young delinquent this question: “Have you stopped
beating your father?”. Answering this question supposes that the answer
to the implicit question ‘Did you beat your father ?’ is ‘Yes’:
– “Did you beat your father?”
– “Yes.”
– “Have you stopped beating him?”
The question asked by the judge, “Have
you stopped beating your father?” displays
three successive dialogue acts κ1 , κ2 and
κ3 that refer respectively to interventions
κ4
: “Did you beat your father?”; “Yes”; “Have
you stopped beating him?”. If the young
κ3
κ3
delinquent continues the dialogue, he implicitly assumes that the interaction beκ2
κ2
tween the two (partial) designs does not
diverge. Hence he accepts justifying his
next intervention on the negative dialogue
κ1
κ1
act corresponding to κ3 , this dialogue act Viewpoint
Viewpoint
of the delinquent
being anchored on the positive dialogue of the judge
act corresponding to κ2 : he assumes he
would have answered “Yes” to the implicit
question.
3.2.

First Elements for Modeling Dialogues

A dialogue is modeled as an interaction between two designs of dialogue
built incrementally from the interventions of the interlocutors, their
turns of speech. A design of dialogue is a design in the sense of Ludics
where the notion of action is replaced by the notion of a dialogue act.
Constraints defining a design of dialogue are otherwise similar to what
defines a design in Ludics. For ease of reading, we continue to speak of
design in place of dialogue design. In this paper, we consider that, for
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each dialogue, the two designs that serve for modeling the dialogue
have the same initial locus. The first positive dialogue act, i.e. the
dialogue act of the locutor who initiates the dialogue, is anchored on
this locus. Correspondingly, the initial dialogue act of her addressee is
negative and anchored also on this locus: this act models the fact that
the addressee accepts the first intervention of the locutor.
With each intervention there is associated an alternate sequence of
dialogue acts that complements the current design of the locutor. The
result should still be a design. In particular, the first dialogue act of the
intervention should be anchored in some previous intervention: indeed
the dialogue is meaningful as soon as each intervention refers to an element previously discussed in the dialogue. Furthermore, the first and
last dialogue acts of each intervention have to be positive: if the last
action is not the daimon, the interlocutor may continue the dialogue.
Dually, the design of the interlocutor is increased by what comes from
the locutor, except when the dialogue diverges. The result should be
such that one of the chronicles ends with a negative action: the interlocutor initiates her own intervention by a dialogue act anchored on
this negative action.
The interaction between designs is similar to what it is in Ludics.
At each step, it requires the presence of corresponding dialogue acts
in the designs: the dialogue may continue if what a locutor utters is
accepted by her interlocutor. Hence, after each intervention, if the
previous requirement is not satisfied, the interaction diverges and the
dialogue fails; if the interaction goes on to a daimon then the dialogue
stops; otherwise, the dialogue resumes with the next intervention.
As we noticed in section 2, a dialogue being given, there is no
need to limit designs to the dialogue acts that model the dialogue. In
fact, designs may be “enlarged” by adding chronicles compatible with
them2 . With that in mind, argumentative schemas are conceivable as
designs given a priori, i.e. before the dialogue takes place. This has
been investigated in Lecomte & Quatrini (2011): each locutor has a dialectal project and the dialogue consists in letting them interact. Finally,
the model we consider is obviously simplistic: in real conditions, natural language is ambiguous, non normalized, and interventions may be
incorrectly understood. One way to tackle this problem may consist
in analyzing a dialogue as a pair of interactions (instead of only one
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interaction). Let us suppose A dialogues with B, then A (resp. B) may
have her own dialogue project P A (resp. P B ), furthermore A (resp. B)
interprets B’s interventions (resp. A’s interventions) as coming from a
design P ′ B (resp. P ′ A ). Hence two interactions take place: one between
P A and P ′ B and the other between P B and P ′ A . There are differences
as soon as interventions from one locutor are not “transparent” for the
other locutor. However, even with differences, the dialogue may still
converge . . . or may diverge if a misunderstanding becomes clear.
3.3.

Argumentative Dialogues

Argumentative dialogues show some peculiarities. In particular speech
acts that compose them are of limited shape, mainly assertions, arguments, denial and concessions. In addition, a notion of win appears,
which seems specific to argumentative dialogues. In a dialogue whose
aim is to exchange information, to share knowledge or a feeling, the
question of whether one of the speakers wins is quite irrelevant. But
to know who is right after a controversy is essential. An argumentative
dialogue is distinguished from (common) dialogues in the sense that
two arguments are opposed, each party having her thesis to defend or
advance. The dialogue is then mainly an exchange of arguments and
counter-arguments with the sole purpose that the dialogue ends when
a thesis is considered winning.
Inferring perspicuous arguments is one of the main reasons why
argumentation is formalized in the framework of logics (e.g.Lascarides
& Asher 2009). We should also mention a lot of studies that use game
theories as theoretical framework (Walton 1985; Mackenzie 1990; Poesio & Mikheev 1998; Loui 1998; Prakken 2008, etc.). In game theory,
two players try to win by applying precise rules. The domain of argumentative dialogues is similar: the dispute between two players ends
with a win for one of the two. However, we notice two main differences
between argumentative dialogues and games. First, the only rule that
makes sense in the argumentative frame is the one relative to keeping the dialogue convergent: interventions should be relevant to the
subject of the discussion. There are no other rules limiting the game.
Second, in most games, each player makes only one elementary move.
In the case of dialogues, one intervention may contain several speech
acts, e.g. both concessions and counter-arguments.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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In order to take care of argumentative dialogues, it is necessary to
specify what is a “win” in our modeling. One of the locutors becomes
a “loser” in one of two situations: she abandons the dispute conceding
the last arguments, or she is obliged to do so by the other locutor (who
becomes the winner): the winner has the last word. The second case
is the standard one in juridical dialogues, where the judge may play in
place of the locutors. Anyway, these two cases correspond to the end
of a convergent interaction: a daimon is used and the locutor that uses
it is the loser. We can specify the situations where a daimon is used:
either the set of locations where an action may take place is empty,
hence the daimon is the only possible action and the opponent really
has “the last word”, or there still exist locations where actions may take
place and the locutor prefers to quit the dialogue. Note that winning is
relative to a dialogue: it may be the case that the current loser may be
a winner with another opponent. One defines a winning strategy, i.e.
a winning design, when every interaction with such a design is either
divergent or ends with a daimon in the opposite design. Such a design
does not contain the daimon, and we should note that this a constraint
for a design to represent a proof.
We consider below speech acts for argumentation proposed in
Prakken (2008) and interpret them in terms of dialogue acts. In his
paper, Prakken considers six elementary types of speech acts for argumentation. We use these schemas of interpretation in the next section
to revisit the example of juridical dialogue given by Prakken and compare its proposal to ours.
• To claim a thesis (to affirm, to assert). This corresponds to posing a proposition in response to which the interlocutor may continue the dialogue by negating it or by conceding it or by asking
for more explanations. Such a proposition may constitute the initial thesis of a dialogue, it may also be an additional element for
an on-going discussion. In juridical situations, the proposition is
unique. In other situations, a locutor may assert several propositions in the same intervention. In our Ludics framework, this
is represented by a proper and positive dialogue act (+, L, I , e),
that may be initial or justified by one of the previous dialogue
acts that introduces one of the subjects of the dialogue. In simple
cases, e.g. juridical dialogues, the ramification I is a singleton.
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• To argue. This corresponds to posing propositions that serve as
argumentative premises and at the same time to articulating the
relationship between these premises and the conclusion. For example, the locutor may affirm a thesis A and justify it with B and
B ⇒ A, hence propositions that are posed are actions corresponding to the two elements B and B ⇒ A. This is the case in juridical dialogues when a locutor (or the judge) uses the law. This
speech act is represented by a unique positive proper dialogue
act (+, L, I , e). Contrary to the previous item, the ramification I ,
hence the locations opened by this act, cannot be a singleton: it
contains at least all the premises and the relation between the
premises and the conclusion.
• To negate (to refuse). We consider this speech act as a kind of
thesis, a claim of the locutor. However, such a claim cannot be an
initial act of the dialogue: it is a refusal of a previous claim3 . In a
general setting, in such a turn of speech, the locutor may negate
and pose a counter-argumentation by giving new facts. It is represented as a proper positive dialogue act (+, L, I , e), necessarily
justified by a previous act that introduces the proposition that is
negated. The ramification I is a singleton in the juridical case,
but may contain other elements in other cases.
• To ask, to request some justification. With respect to the structure of a dialogue, there is no difference between this and the
previous item except the linguistic form it has.
• To concede. This consists in accepting one assertion that the
interlocutor has made. Hence the dialogue will not continue
on this element. As such, a concession is only a part of a turn
of speech: either the dialogue ends with this (last) concession
and the locutor abandons the dialogue, or the locutor continues
her intervention on another element still under discussion. A sequence of two dialogue acts is associated with the concession:
(+, L, {L 0 }, e0 ), (−, L 0 , ;, e1 ) where
- the first one, positive, expresses what is conceded, its focus is
the one created by the affirmation that one concedes and its ramification is a singleton,
- the second dialogue act is a negative one, it is focused on L 0 :
www.thebalticyearbook.org

Argumentation and Inference

24

the locus that the immediate previous act created, and it has an
empty ramification. The effect is that the conceded affirmation
disappears for the remainder of the dialogue.
• To abandon. This act ends the dialogue in a convergent way.
The final intervention of a judge (the sentence) induces necessarily such an act. The positive dialogue act (†, e) fits exactly this
situation. Its use finishes the interaction.
3.4.

Towards an Argumentation Framework

The previous sections enabled us to define an argumentative dialogue
as an interaction between two (dialogue) designs in which each intervention may be recognized as a sequence of speech acts, themselves
being represented by a sequence of elementary dialogue acts. In ideal
cases, i.e. when the interaction ends in a convergent way, the looser is
the locutor who played the daimon.
In addition to the argumentative dialogue itself, in order to define
a full argumentative framework, we have to give an account of the
state of commitments for each locutor, which constitutes the context of
the dialogue. We will give an account of these contextual elements by
means of commitment states: one for each locutor. These commitment
states are augmented during the process of dialogue as they integrate
new elements arising from the dialogue. More precisely, we identify in
this way the facts which are assumed publicly by each locutor. Furthermore, the extension and the updating of these commitment states are
one of the main issues of the dialogue. This is taken into account by
means of the dynamics of interaction.
A commitment state is a kind of knowledge base. Usually, a knowledge base is defined as a set of logical formulas: the propositions which
are associated with the facts that the locutor assumes. Here this notion
is slightly more refined. In Ludics the notion of logical formulas is
replaced by the more general notion of behaviour, i.e. a closed set of
designs with the same base. Here we generalize still further by including in a commitment state some sets of designs that are not necessarely
closed. Even if we do not completely exploit this in this paper, it should
give the opportunity of a fine-grained account of knowledges. Indeed,
some knowledge is assumed as fully explicit propositions while other
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may be only partially assumed: one or several logical propositions may
be associated with a given utterance without their full decompositions
being known.
DEFINITION 2 (Commitment state).
A commitment element (C.E.) is a set of designs with the same base.
It is either associated with some factual proposition (a certain fact is assumed) and its base is positive, or it is associated with an inferential
proposition (if something is valid then another thing is valid) and its base
is negative.
A commitment state (C.S.) is a set of commitment elements B =
{E1 , . . . , Ei , . . . } respectively based on Γi ⊢ ∆i .
Moreover the set B is provided with some internal locative structure:
suppose that EF is a C.E. associated with the knowledge that F is the case
while EF⇒G is the knowledge that under the hypothesis F , G is the case,
then the C.E. EF and EF⇒G are respectively based on ⊢ L F and L F ⊢ L G
(where L F and L G are loci for F and G).
The commitment elements may be more or less elaborated.
The minimal account of a factual proposition ‘F ’ is a C.E. reduced
to a unique design based on ⊢ L F . The minimal account of some inferential proposition ‘F implies G’ is a C.E. reduced to a unique design
based on L F ⊢ L G .
We then represent an argumentative dialogue between two protagonists S and A in a way similar to Gazdar (1981); Ginzburg et al.
(2003), Loui (1998) and others; that is, by a sequence of dialogue
states. The specificity here is the definition of the dialogue state: it is a
triple of data, the commitment state of S at this time, the commitment
state of A at this time, and the net of two designs associated with the
current dialogue at this time.
At each step, that is, after each intervention of one locutor, for example S 4 , the situation evolves as follows:
- except for the first intervention of the dialogue, the design of S is
increased by the sequence of the duals of the dialogue acts associated
with A’s previous intervention, as S answers to A without diverging;
- the design of S is increased by the alternate sequence of dialogue acts
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associated with her current intervention;
- the commitment state of S is updated according to the following principles: it is increased by the C.E. associated with the propositions assumed by the current intervention of S (the asserted propositions, the
negated ones, the conceded ones). The C.E. which belong to the commitment state of S and on which S changed her mind are erased.
DEFINITION 3 (Argumentative situation).
A dialogue state is a tuple (Bi S , D i S , Bi A , D i A ) where Bi A and Bi S are the
commitment states of respectively A and S at step i of the dialogue and
D i A and D i S are the respective designs of A and S at step i of the dialogue.
The step 0 is before the intervention which starts the dialogue, D i S and
D i A are empty and still considered as designs. Each intervention enables
to go from step i to a next step i + 1; we denote by P i the locutor who
produces the intervention from i to i + 1 and P i the other locutor.
An argumentative situation is a sequence of dialogue states such that:
(1) Bi+1 Pi is obtained from Bi Pi by adding the C.E. corresponding to
the propositions either asserted or conceded during the current intervention. The C.S. is updated by erasing designs that correspond
to the affirmation of factual propositions while their negations are
now conceded.
(2) D i+1 Pi is obtained from D i Pi by adding:
- the duals of sequences of dialogue acts corresponding to the immediate previous intervention from P i . Indeed, since P i continues the
dialogue, she accepts the intervention of her addressee.
- the sequence of dialogue acts corresponding to the current intervention performed by P i .
The management of the commitment states, their updating and
their utilization in the dialogue in progress make use of properties and
notions of Ludics that we discuss below:
• Negation. We distinguish between a positive factual proposition:
something is the case and a negative factual proposition: something is not the case. The C.E. associated with the negative factual
proposition is the design which expressed the logical negation of
the positive one. More precisely, the following designs are respectively associated with the factual propositions ‘F is the case’
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and ‘F is not the case’, when F is an atomic factual proposition
(L F is the location of F , L notF is the location of not F ):
†

⊢
;

⊢ LF

REMARKS :
(1) Loci are indexed by their intuitive interpretation. These addresses should not be confused with the logical notation of
propositions.
(2) For a stricly commutative treatment of conjunction, we need
both designs in the right in the C.E. associated with the conjunction of F and G is not the case.

LF ⊢

;
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⊢ L notF

Factual propositions that are logically decomposable may also be
represented as C.E. In such cases the designs start with actions
corresponding to the adequate logical decomposition. We give
below the example of a conjunctive factual proposition.

• Delocation. In Ludics the more primitive notion is that of location.

The following designs are respectively associated with the factual
propositions: ‘the conjunction of F and G is the case’ (located at
L FandG ) and ‘the conjunction of F and G is not the case’ (located at
L not(FandG) ):

When a proposition appears in some dialogue act, the locus of
the dialogue on which this proposition is anchored has to be seen
as a delocation of the locus on which this proposition is stored
in the C.S. Such a delocation is obtained by using a fax design,
presented in subsection 2.3. We do not insist on this point here.
Nevertheless we may notice that this is very useful for describing
how some information is transmitted.

†

⊢
;

LF ⊢
⊢ L notF
;

L G ⊢ L notF

;

;

In our modeling, location is also fundamental.

Consider, for example, the following situation: a speaker asserts
a factual proposition F which is conceded by her addressee. Using our modeling of dialogue, we represent this situation by the
following interaction:

⊢ LF

⊢ LG

⊢ L notF , L notG

L notF ⊢

L notG ⊢

L FandG ⊢

⊢ LF

⊢ L not(FandG)

L notF ⊢

⊢ L FandG
†

⊢
;

LG ⊢

; κ3

;

κ1

⊢ L assF
The dialogue seen from S

LF ⊢

κ2

⊢ L notF
L assF ⊢
The dialogue seen from A

⊢ L notG
;

L F ⊢ L notG
⊢ L notF , L notG
L FandG ⊢
⊢ L not(FandG)
www.thebalticyearbook.org

The dialogue act κ1 is the assertion of F by S.
The sequence of dialogue acts κ2 κ3 is the concession of F by A.
Indeed, the dialogue occurs on loci, say ξ, ξ.1, ξ.1.1, instead of
L assF , L notF and L F . The design above ξ.1.1 is in fact obtained
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from a delocation of the C.E. associated with the proposition F
in the C.S. of S. Moreover, a complete account of the concession
has to give an account of the appropriation by the addressee A of
the proposition F . This is possible if we represent the concession
by a F a x delocating ξ.1.1 to ρ. In the figure above representing
the dialogue we retained only the useful interacting part of it.
The full situation is as follows:
;

⊢ ξ.1.1
ξ.1 ⊢
κ1
⊢ξ
The dialogue seen from S

F ax
ξ.1.1 ⊢ ρ
κ2
⊢ ρ, ξ.1
ξ⊢ρ
The dialogue seen from A

The resulting design of this interaction is the C.E. associated with
the factual proposition F stored by A. We give an account of
the transmission of the factual proposition ‘F is the case’ by a
succession of delocations of this proposition: from the locus L F
which is the locus on which the proposition is anchored in the
commitment state of the speaker S to the locus ξ.1.1 which is
the locus of the dialogue on which the proposition is anchored.
And then from ξ.1.1 to ρ, the locus on which the proposition is
anchored in the commitment state of the addressee A.
• Interaction. In a C.S. the designs may interact with each other.
Moreover all possible logical combinations between them are
possible provided that adequate delocations are used. The normal forms resulting from their interactions belong also to the
C.S.
In order to illustrate the effect of an intervention during an argumentative dialogue, we give below an example which is developed in
the next section.
Example 8. A juridical controversy between a plaintiff P and a defendant D starts as follows:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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I1
I2

Plaintiff:
Defendant:

I3

Plaintiff:

I claim that defendant owes me 500 euro.
I dispute plaintiff’s claim.
Defendant owes me 500 euro by r 1 since we concluded a valid sales contract, I delivered but defendant did not pay.

To start, we focus on the argumentative dialogue. According to our
modeling, the two first interventions I 1 and I 2 each create only one
new locus, respectively L 1 and L 2 . On the contrary, the intervention L 3
is represented by a dialogue act which creates four new loci. Indeed
the utterance I 3 ‘Defendant owes me 500 euro by r 1 since we concluded a
valid sales contract, I delivered but defendant did not pay’ makes explicit
four argumentative elements to support his assertion ‘Defendant owes
me 500 euro’. These argumentative elements are: a law article r 1 ; the
fact that both parties concluded a valid contract; the fact that plaintiff
delivered his service and, finally, the fact that defendant did not pay
500 euros. By means of this dialogue act, we indicate that the dialogue
may continue using loci L 31 , . . . , L 34 respectively associated with these
four elements.

I3

..
..

L 31 ⊢

L 32 ⊢

L 33 ⊢

⊢L 2
I1

..
..

L1 ⊢
⊢L 0
Plaintiff

..
..

L 34 ⊢

..
..

⊢(L 31 ,)L 32 ,L 33 ,L 34
I2

L2 ⊢
⊢L 1
L0 ⊢
Defendant

Figure 1: A juridical example: Interventions I 1 to I 3
Let us detail how we interpret this intervention with respect to the
commitment state of plaintiff P. Plaintiff gives several pieces of information: there is a valid contract between P and D, P delivered, and P
applies the law r 1 , the implicit content of r 1 is If there is a valid sales
contract between a vendor and an emptor and if the vendor delivers then
the emptor has to pay’.
The following C.E. are added to the commitment state of P by this
third intervention:
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• The design associated with the law r 1 is based on L Cont−and−Del ⊢
L to.pay . This is a rather elaborated design:
;

⊢ L to.pay
;

L Del ⊢, L to.pay
⊢ L notDel , L to.pay
;

L Cont ⊢ L notDel , L to.pay
⊢ L notCont , L notDel , L to.pay
D r1

=

L Cont−and−Del ⊢ L to.pay

• The designs respectively associated with the assertions ‘there is a
valid contract between P and D’ and ‘P delivered’ are the following:
D cont

=

;

;

⊢ L Cont

D del = ⊢ L Del

• There is also in the C.S. of P the following design associated
with the fact that defendant did not pay (interpretation of intervention I 1 ):
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4. A JURIDICAL CONTROVERSY

A juridical controversy is an argumentative dialogue between three
protagonists among whom someone plays a special role: the judge has
to allocate the burden of proof and has to evaluate the argumentation
in order to formulate a sentence. However, we propose to account for
legal controversies as if the dialogue concerns only the defendant and
plaintiff: each intervention of the judge is represented as an intervention from one of the two parties. After each such intervention, the turn
of speech is to the other party. In this way we model the distribution
of the burden of proof by the judge: she imposes concessions, she validates assertions, and when she gives the turn of speech to the other
protagonist, she implicitly asks for additional elements. Moreover, the
sequence of dialogue acts associated with the last intervention of the
judge, i.e. the sentence, enables her to close the pending branches in
the dialogue designs, in such a way that the protagonist that has the
turn of speech has no more available locus in his design: he is obliged
to play the daimon, hence becomes the loser.
In this section we consider an example of a juridical controversy.
This example is due to Prakken who introduced and studied it (Prakken
2008).

†

⊢
;

L to.pay ⊢
D not.paid

=

⊢ L notPay

The loci L 31 , . . . , L 34 respectively associated with the argumentative
elements in the intervention I 3 are delocations of the loci on which the
four designs D r1 , D cont , D del and D not.paid are anchored. A computation
using these designs yields a contradiction: indeed, the result of the
interaction between designs D cont , D del and D r1 (by using additional
logical steps) is the following design:
;

D to.pay

=

⊢ L to.pay

Then the interaction between this latter design and D not.paid results in
a logical contradiction. The subsequent dialogue consists of giving arguments until the contradiction may be solved.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Example 9. The following juridical dialogue takes place between plaintiff
(P) and defendant (D).
I1
I2
I3
I4
I5
I6
I7
J1

I8
I9

I 10
I 11
I 12
J2
I 13
J3
I 14
I 15
I 16
J4

I claim that defendant owes me 500 euro.
I dispute plaintiff’s claim.
Defendant owes me 500 euro by r 1 since we concluded a valid sales contract, I delivered but defendant did not pay.
Defendant:
I concede that plaintiff delivered and I did not pay, but I dispute that we
have a valid contract.
Plaintiff:
We have a valid contract by r 2 since this document is a contract signed by
us.
Defendant:
I dispute that this is my signature.
Plaintiff:
Why?
Judge:
By r 3 the party who invokes a signature under a document which is not an
avidavit has the burden to prove that it is authentic when this is disputed,
so plaintiff must prove this is defendant’s signature.
Plaintiff:
This is defendant’s signature since it looks like these three signatures of
which we know they are defendant’s.
Defendant:
But it does not look like this signature, which is also mine. Besides, another
reason why we have no contract is that I was insane when I agreed, so r 4
applies, which makes section r 2 inapplicable.
Plaintiff:
I dispute that you were insane.
Defendant:
My insanity is proven by this court’s document, which declares me insane.
Plaintiff:
I dispute that this is a court’s document.
Judge:
Plaintiff, since this document looks like a court’s document, i.e. like an
affidavit, by r 5 the burden is on you to prove that it is not.
Plaintiff:
This lab report proves that this document is forged.
Judge:
This document is inadmissible as evidence by r 6 since I received it after the
written pleading phase.
Plaintiff:
Nevermind, even if defendant was insane, this could not be known to me
during the negotiations, so r 4 does not apply by r 7 .
Defendant:
Why could my insanity not be known to you ?
Plaintiff:
Since you looked normal all the time.
Judge (deciding the dispute):
I am conviced by plaintiff’s evidence that defendant’s signature under the
contract is authentic. Yet I cannot grant plaintiff’s claim since the fact that
defendant looked normal during the negotiations is insufficient to conclude
that defendant’s insanity could not be known to plaintiff: he might have
known if he had checked the court’s register. Therefore I deny plaintiff his
claim.
Plaintiff:
Defendant:
Plaintiff:

For easiness of reading of the presentation, loci are denoted by
labels L i (when they are produced by an intervention I i of plaintiff
or defendant) and J j (when they are produced by an intervention
J j of the judge), L 0 is an arbitrarily chosen locus on which the exchange starts. We add sub-indexes to distinguish loci created by the
same intervention (for example intervention I 3 is interpreted by a dialogue act with a ramification containing four elements, we denote it:
(+, L 2 , {L 31 , L 32 , L 33 , L 34 }, e) where e is the full utterance constituting
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intervention I 3 . In figures given in this section, an intervention is depicted as a shaded area.
4.1.

Interventions I 1 to I 4

The three first interventions were studied in example 8. Intervention I 4
is more complex, it is not made available by a unique dialogue act but
by a sequence of several. Indeed, in intervention I 4 , defendant concedes two plaintiff’s elements: ‘plaintiff delivered’ and ‘I did not pay’.
These two concessions are successively represented, each of them being a positive dialogue act followed by a negative one with an empty
ramification, at first above L 34 then above L 33 . At last intervention I 4
ends by negating the factual proposition ‘The parties concluded a valid
sales contract’, this is represented as a positive dialogue act focused
on L 32 and with a singleton as ramification. The argumentative dialogue until this fourth intervention is represented in figure 2. After this
fourth intervention, the commitment state of D, C S D , is increased with
two designs: D del and D not.pay , that are delocated from the commitment
state of P, C S P (these designs are described in example 8).
..
..

L 43 ⊢
⊢L 32

..
..

⊢L 43
L 31 ⊢

L 32 ⊢

I4
⊢L 42
L 33 ⊢

;

⊢L 41
L 34 ⊢

;

L 42 ⊢L 32
⊢L 32 ,L 33

L 41 ⊢L 32 ,L 33

;

⊢(L 31 ,)L 32 ,L 33 ,L 34

⊢L 2

L2 ⊢

L1 ⊢

⊢L 1

⊢L 0

L0 ⊢

Plaintiff

;

Defendant

Figure 2: A juridical example: Intervention I 4
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4.2.

Interventions I 5 to J 1

4.3.

The three following interventions, I 5 , I 6 , I 7 , are modeled in a similar
way. The judge’s intervention J 1 introduces the application of a rule
(r 3 ), a non-debatable premise (‘the document is not an avidavit’), and
the obligation for plaintiff to prove the validity of the signature. In the
interaction associated with the argumentative dialogue between plaintiff and defendant, it appears as if it were an intervention of defendant.
Its effect is to give the turn to plaintiff. This is represented in figure 3.
ω
.

J1

..
..

..
..

I5
L 31 ⊢

J 10 ⊢

J 11 ⊢

L 43 ⊢

L7 ⊢

⊢L 32

⊢L 6

L 42 ⊢L 32

L 51 ⊢

L 52 ⊢
⊢L 43

⊢L 42

L 32 ⊢

L 33 ⊢

;

⊢L 41
L 34 ⊢

;

;

⊢L 32 ,L 33
L 41 ⊢L 32 ,L 33

;

⊢(L 31 ,)L 32 ,L 33 ,L 34

⊢L 2

L2 ⊢

L1 ⊢

⊢L 1

⊢L 0

L0 ⊢

Plaintiff

J 12 ⊢L 51

⊢L 7 ,L 51

⊢(J 10 ,J 11 ,) J 12
I7

..
.

L 6 ⊢L 51
I6
⊢L 51 ,L 52

π2

π1
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;

Defendant
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Interventions I 8 to I 16 and J 4

The dialogue continues accordingly. However two elements deserve
attention: intervention I 9 and the judge’s conclusion J 4 .
By his intervention I 9 , defendant, at first, counter-argues about the
validity of the signature without letting the plaintiff answer. On the
contrary, he continues by introducing a new counter-argument. The
passage between these two different stages is expressed by ‘Besides’. So,
the defendant’s intervention I 9 is composed by a sequence of dialogue
acts:
- the first one is positive: (+, L 8 , L 91 , nosi gn) and it is expressed by
‘But it does not look like this signature, which is also mine’.
- the second one is negative: (−, L 91 , L 91 ′ , B), and expressed by
B=‘Besides, another reason why we have no contract’. Defendant keeps
the turn of speech and in this way he deprives plaintiff of the opportunity to answer. Nevertheless, a positive locus L 92 still remains in his
design: it is still available to him to argue that the signature is not
valid.
- at last the third dialogue act is positive: (+, L 51 , {L 92 , L 93 }, noval).
It is focused on the locus L 51 that a previous dialogue act created (use
of rule r 2 in intervention I 5 ). The third dialogue act creates two loci:
L 92 and L 93 on which the discussion may continue, either about rule r 4
or about defendant’s illness. This third dialogue act is expressed by ‘I
was insane when I agreed so r 4 applies, which make section r 2 inapplicable’.

Figure 3: A juridical example: Interventions I 5 to I 7 and J 1
Both commitment states C S D and C S P are extended with designs
associated with rule r 3 and the factual proposition ‘the document is
not an avidavit’. At this step we find also in C S P a design associated
with the factual proposition ‘The signature on the contract is valid’ while
there is in C S D a design associated with the factual proposition ‘The
signature on the contract is not valid’.
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..
..

L 141 ⊢

I14
I13

L 16 ⊢

I16

⊢L 15

L 142 ⊢

L 143 ⊢

..
..

⊢L 92 ,(J 30 ,J 31 ,J 32 )

⊢L 16 ,L ′ 91

L 13 ⊢L 92

L 15 ⊢L ′ 91

⊢L 92 ,(J 20 ,J 21 ,) J 22

..
..

L 12 ⊢L 92

I12
I10

J 30 ⊢
J 21 ⊢

J 22 ⊢

⊢L 12
L 11 ⊢

I15

⊢(L 141 ,L 142 ,) L 143 ,L ′ 91

J3
J2

I11

⊢L 10

L 92 ⊢L ′ 91

L 93 ⊢

L ′ 91 ⊢

⊢L 51 ,L ′ 91

L 10 ⊢L 92

⊢L 91

L 91 ⊢L 51

L8 ⊢

⊢L 51 ,L 8

L 51 ⊢

⊢(J 10 ,J 11 ,) J 12

J 12 ⊢L 51

π1

π2

ω
.

I8

J 32 ⊢

⊢L 13
J 20 ⊢

⊢L 92 ,L 11
⊢L 92 ,L 93

J 31 ⊢

I9

..
.

⊢L 0

L0 ⊢

Plaintiff

Defendant

Figure 4: A juridical example: Interventions I 8 to I 16
After intervention I 9 , two new elements are included in C S D : the
design associated with the factual proposition ‘Defendant was insane
during the contract’s signature’, and the one associated with the inferential proposition ‘Defendant’s insanity implies that r 2 is inapplicable’
which is an application of law r 4 .
†
⊢
L 16 ⊢
⊢L 16

⊢L 15
L 141 ⊢

⊢L 92 ,(J 30 ,J 31 ,J 32 )

J4

J 20 ⊢

⊢L 16 ,L ′ 91

J 21 ⊢
⊢L 12

L 13 ⊢L 92

L 15 ⊢L ′ 91

⊢L 92 ,(J 20 ,J 21 ,) J 22

⊢(L 141 ,L 142 ,) L 143 ,L ′ 91

⊢L 10

L 92 ⊢L ′ 91

L 93 ⊢

L 12 ⊢L 92

⊢J 41

⊢L 92 ,L 11

L

′

;

91 ⊢

L 11 ⊢

⊢L 51 ,L ′ 91

L 10 ⊢L 92

⊢L 91

⊢L 92 ,L 93

L8 ⊢

⊢L 51 ,L 8

L 51 ⊢

⊢(J 10 ,J 11 ,) J 12

J 12 ⊢L 51

π1

π2

ω
.

⊢L 0
Plaintiff

L 91 ⊢L 51

..
.

L0 ⊢
Defendant

Figure 5: A juridical example: Intervention J 4
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L 143 ⊢

L 142 ⊢

J 30 ⊢

;

J 22 ⊢
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The judge formulates her sentence when the situation is as follows:
the only avalaible loci are L 16 and L ′ 91 , potential foci for defendant’s
interventions.
Indeed, loci associated with laws or with factual propositions asserted by the judge cannot be discussed in the dialogue. These loci
are weakened in the model5 . Locus L ′ 91 is a pending locus, it concerns
the validity of the signature. About that point the judge gives right to
plaintiff, she imposes a concession to defendant, that is the succession:
(+, L 91 ′ , J 41 , valsi g?)(−, J 41 , ;, valsi g) in the design of defendant (and
also the dual in plaintiff’s design).
Locus L 16 refers to defendant’s insanity. About that point, the
judge gives right to defendant, the corresponding dialogue act is
(+, L 16 , ;, nor mal) in defendant’s design and (−, L 16 , ;, nor mal) in
plaintiff’s design (a concession). So, it is now the plaintiff’s turn of
speech, he has no more avalaible loci, he is obliged to play the daimon.
His claim is set aside.
We may also check the situation of the commitment states. Accepting defendant’s illness, the judge imposes that C S D as well as C S P
integrate the design associated with this fact. Moreover, the design associated with the law r 4 necessarily belongs to the two commitment
states. The result of the interaction between these two designs is the
one corresponding to the fact that r 2 is not applicable. The design
D to.pay is then no more derivable and the contradiction disappears.

J 32 ⊢

4.4.

Remarks about the modeling

Let us outline the main points of our modeling, by means of which a
complete formalization of Prakken’s example was realized.
In the interaction which constitutes the argumentative dialogue,
the judge intervenes in place of one or the other party. Her interventions impose dialogue acts corresponding either to concessions or to requests for further information. In the latter case, this is underlined by
the fact that the judge gives the turn to the party that has the burden of
proof. The judge’s last intervention closes the dialogue and makes explicit the judgement. This last intervention ends still pending branches,
either by means of empty ramification or by means of a final dialogue
act: the daimon. The conclusion derives from the way concessions are
imposed. The last negative act with an empty ramification is in the
Vol. 8: Games, Game Theory
and Game Semantics

39

Christophe Fouqueré & Myriam Quatrini

design of the party who now has the turn of speech: this establishes
the party who is obliged to play the daimon.
Even though the controversy is represented as an interaction between two designs, the commitment states give the way the argumentative elements are articulated; computation inside each commitment
state gives an account of the respective positions of the different protagonists. So, at the beginning, the argumentative elements given by
plaintiff justify (according to him) his claim. Once formalized in the
commitment state of P, the designs associated with these elements
yield by interaction to a contradiction which sums up the claim: something needs to be repaired in order to eliminate this contradiction. The
judge validates or invalidates arguments, that is to say designs in commitment states, to solve the contradiction that may result from the
interaction between them. This is indeed what she does when she formulates the sentence. Either the judge invalidates the illness argument,
in which case rule r 2 applies and also its logical consequences, which
justifies plaintiff’s claim and needs a judge’s intervention: she imposes
the design D to.pay for the defendant, or she adds the design D illness to the
commitment state of the plaintiff, in which case nothing has to change
for the defendant’s state, in particular neither the premises of r 2 nor
its conclusions are in it.
5.

CONCLUSION

In the previous sections, we presented Ludics and the way it may be
used for modeling argumentative dialogues. It should be clear that this
is an ongoing research that changes largely standard approaches to argumentation, as Ludics changes radically the point of view we may
have on logics. In Ludics, the fundamental operation concerns interaction between objects called designs. Such objects may clearly be interpreted in a certain sense as “proofs”. However, two main differences
exist with what is generally called a proof that should be considered.
First, a design may include daimon actions, this allows for considering proofs and counter-proofs in the same language. Second, a design may be infinite (in depth as well as height), hence such an object
may include enough information to interact with an infinite number
of counter-objects. We recall also that Ludics is a rebuilding of Linear
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Logic: formulas may be denoted by closed sets of designs. In that way,
one recovers standard concepts of logics, say truth, proof, etc.
If we summarize our modeling of argumentation by means of Ludics, the dialogue is conceived as an interaction between two designs,
one for each locutor. Moreover, each interaction gives rise to facts,
either arguments, concessions, and so on, that are modeled also as designs in the commitment state of the locutor. Computations with such
pieces of information is also done with the operation of interaction.
The modeling of the juridical example we considered in the last section
follows these principles. Moreover we showed how the interventions
of a judge (and more importantly her sentence) are interpreted as interventions forced for one or the other party. This approach needs to
be carried on to improve the propositions and to tackle in an extensive
way other questions relevant for argumentation modeling.
Notes
1
The reader may find in Walton (2012) definitions for standard terms in use, say
rebuttal, refutation, proleptic argumentation.
2
“compatible” means that what is obtained is still a design.
3
Note that an initial claim may also be a negation. There is a difference between beginning a dialogue with, e.g., “Paul did not come yesterday” and saying “You are wrong.
Paul did not come.” as a reply to “Paul came to the party yesterday.”
4
The situation is perfectly symmetrical between S and A.
5
In figures, weakened loci are put in parentheses.
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